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Tax Expenditures for Owner-Occupied Housing:
Deductions for Property Taxes and Mortgage Interest and the
Exclusion of Imputed Rental Income
By James Poterba and Todd Sinai*
Federal income tax policy affects the cost of
homeownership for many households. Popular
discussions of the favorable tax treatment of
owner-occupied housing usually focus on the
tax-deductibility of mortgage interest and property tax payments, as well as the specialized tax
rules that affect housing capital gains. Academic
discussions, in contrast, emphasize the exclusion
of the imputed rental income on owner-occupied
housing as the key tax benefit for homeowners.
This paper summarizes the current distribution
of the tax benefits associated with the mortgage
interest and property tax deductions. It contrasts
this with the distribution of tax benefits associated with the current tax regime for imputed
rental income relative to one that taxes homeowners as if they were landlords. It also reports
how removing either deduction, or taxing homeowners as landlords, would affect the user cost
of owner-occupied housing.

sample includes 22,595 household observations,
based on five replicates for each of 4,519 underlying households. The subsample we analyze
excludes 1,475 observations corresponding to
households that live on a farm or a ranch or in
a mobile home, 812 additional observations for
households headed by someone under the age of
25, 64 additional observations that report having mortgages but pay no mortgage interest, 11
additional observations with loan-to-value ratios
above 1.5, and 64 additional observations with
inexplicably high estimated marginal tax rates.
This leaves a subsample of 20,169 observations.
We estimate each household’s marginal federal
income tax rates for the 2003 tax year using the
NBER TAXSIM federal and state income tax
calculators and Kevin Moore’s (2003) mapping
of SCF data to tax return items.
Table 1 reports summary information on
housing market attributes for several subgroups
of the population, stratifying by age of the
household head and household income in 2003.
Household income is defined as Adjusted Gross
Income plus the following items: income from
nontaxable investments, an estimate of employer
contributions for FICA, payments from unemployment insurance and workers compensation, gross Social Security income, and any
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) preference
items that can be estimated from the SCF.
The first panel of Table 1 shows the percentage of homeowners who itemize on their federal
income tax returns—a precondition for claiming the mortgage interest or property tax deductions. We categorize a household as an itemizer if
TAXSIM estimates that the household’s federal
income tax liability would be lower if it itemized
than if it claimed the standard deduction. More
than 98 percent of homeowners with income in
excess of $125,000 claim itemized deductions,
compared with only 23 percent of those with
incomes below $40,000. The TAXSIM-based
imputed itemization rate is 63.1 percent, which

I. Patterns of Homeownership, Mortgage
Borrowing, and Itemization Status

Variation across age and income groups in
the tax savings associated with the mortgage
interest and property tax deductions results
primarily from differences in homeownership
rates, itemization rates, and the financing of
homes. We illustrate these differences using
the sample of nonfarm households in the 2004
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF
* Poterba: Department of Economics, MIT, 50 Memorial
Drive, Cambridge, MA 02142, and NBER (e-mail:
Poterba@mit.edu); Sinai: Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania, 1465 Steinberg Hall—Dietrich Hall, 3620
Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302, and NBER
(e-mail: Sinai@wharton.upenn.edu). We are grateful to
Igar Fuki for outstanding research assistance, to Alan
Auerbach and Edward Glaeser for helpful comments,
and to the National Science Foundation (Poterba), the
Smith Richardson Foundation, and the Research Sponsors
Program of the Zell-Lurie Real Estate Center at Wharton
(Sinai) for research support.
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Table 1—Homeownership, Itemization Status, and House Value
Annual household income ($)
Age of household head

,40K

40–75K

75–125K

125–250K

250K1

All

Panel A: Homeowner characteristics
Fraction who itemize
25–35
35–50
50–65
. 65
All

54.3
51.8
33.7
3.8
23.4

74.4
77.8
64.4
37.5
66.1

25–35
35–50
50–65
. 65
All

60.5
51.2
29.3
9.8
25.9

72.8
60.0
29.6
13.5
44.9

25–35
35–50
50–65
.65
All

$119.4
126.7
156.1
159.8
149.6

147.5
188.1
208.0
266.8
201.7

97.3
91.7
83.1
55.8
85.5

95.7
99.9
98.7
92.0
98.4

100.0
100.0
100.0
99.6
99.9

78.5
82.5
70.6
22.9
63.1

57.7
36.7
29.5
7.2
29.4

68.9
55.0
32.5
11.6
38.6

674.7
993.0
1,155.0
1,060.6
1,072.0

194.6
273.8
313.4
233.8
266.2

Loan-to-value ratio (percent)
71.2
55.3
37.3
18.4
47.4

67.3
53.2
34.8
12.7
42.6

Mean value of owner-occupied home (000s)
259.1
253.7
264.6
283.5
261.8

343.3
422.3
428.2
504.5
427.8

Panel B: Tax saving from current law
Average tax saving from mortgage interest deduction
25–35
35–50
50–65
. 65
All

$208
216
143
5
91

$592
719
476
134
523

25–35
35–50
50–65
. 65
All

109
125
129
75
99

229
299
298
208
271

$1,817
1,483
1,074
351
1,264

$3,603
3,599
2,039
914
2,703

$7,077
5,833
6,348
1,435
5,459

$1,155
1,598
1,226
149
1,060

1,970
2,939
3,120
2,548
2,937

393
618
647
242
504

Average tax saving from property tax deduction
619
559
515
350
529

1,009
1,179
1,095
1,076
1,125

Average tax saving from exclusion of net imputed rental Income
25–35
35–50
50–65
. 65
All

655
650
561
418
511

718
922
1,253
1,812
1,146

1,849
1,870
2,000
2,083
1,935

2,992
3,881
3,885
4,206
3,861

6,417
9,529
11,163
9,976
10,293

1271
2,054
2,420
1,299
1,879

Notes: Authors’ calculations using 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances and Moore’s (2003) interface between NBER
TAXSIM program and the SCF. Averages are weighted using the SCF’s replicate weights. Net Imputed Rental Income (bottom panel) is 3.5 percent of house value.

compares with 63.3 percent using self-reported
itemization status from the SCF. The aggregate
similarity masks differences for the youngest and oldest households making less than
$125,000: for the under-35 group, our imputed
itemization rate is about 20 percentage points

higher than the self-reported value. The difference for the over-65 group is of roughly equal
magnitude, but in the opposite direction.
The second panel in Table 1 summarizes
the loan-to-value ratio for homeowners in each
age-income category. The average loan-to-value
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ratio for households over the age of 65 with an
income of less than $40,000 is 9.8 percent, compared with 55 (69) percent for all households
with heads between the ages of 35 and 50 (25
and 35). The third panel shows the mean value
of primary homes for homeowners in various
income-age cells. There is a strong positive relationship between household income and house
value. Home value averages $201,700 for families with incomes of $40,000–75,000, compared
with $427,800 for those with incomes between
$125,000 and $250,000. Mortgage interest and
property tax deductions, as well as the tax saving from excluding imputed rental income from
the tax base, tend to rise with house value.
II. User Costs and Imputed Rental Income

The neoclassical investment model, which
focuses on the user cost of capital, is a standard tool for studying housing demand and for
analyzing the equilibrium value of the imputed
rental income accruing to homeowners under
various tax regimes. Poterba (1992), Joseph
Gyourko and Sinai (2004), Charles Himmelberg,
Christopher Mayer, and Sinai (2005) (hereafter
HMS), and many others have used this approach
to describe homeowners’ marginal costs of purchasing additional housing services. If owneroccupied housing were taxed in the same way as
other durable investments, homeowners would
be taxed on their rental income but they would
be able to deduct interest payments, depreciation and maintenance expenses, property taxes,
and other costs of providing housing services.
Our approach to estimating the user cost
of owner-occupied housing follows most previous studies, except in our treatment of the
risk-adjusted cost of funds. Many past studies
have used a loan-to-value weighted average of
the mortgage interest rate and a return on an
alternative asset to measure this cost. Neither
return measure is an appropriate component of
the cost of funds. HMS (2005) note that mortgage
interest rates include not only the risk-adjusted
required return on a housing loan, but also a premium for the refinancing and default options that
the lender provides to the borrower. The cost of
these financial options should be removed from
the cost of funds. In addition, the returns on alternative assets do not reflect the risk premium that
investments in owner-occupied homes should
command. Our approach follows some previous

studies, such as Poterba (1992), in adding a risk
premium component to the user cost calculation.
Homeowners bear both asset-class risk and idiosyncratic, house-specific risk.
We define the appropriate pre-tax cost of funds
as the risk-free medium-term interest rate plus a
risk premium. We measure the former using the
ten-year Treasury bond rate, rT , and assume a
pre-tax risk premium of 200 basis points. This
value follows earlier studies but is admittedly
not well grounded in a calculation of risk and
return trade-offs. The loan-to-value ratio does
not affect the cost of funds in our expression for
the user cost. We recognize that the marginal
income tax rate applicable to mortgage interest
and property tax deductions may differ from
that on investment income if a taxpayer does not
itemize. We define the user cost, c, as
(1) 	 c 5 31 2 5tdedl 1 ty 11 2 l2 64 rT

2 tded l 1rM 2 rT2 1 11 2 ty 2 b

1 m 1 11 2 tded 2 tprop – πe .

In this expression, rM denotes the mortgage  interest rate, l is the loan-to-value ratio,
tded l 1rM 2 rT2 is the tax subsidy to the default
and refinancing options that the homeowner purchases by paying rM rather than rT as a mortgage
interest rate, b is the pre-tax risk premium, m is
the cost of depreciation and maintenance, set to
0.025, tprop equals the national average property
tax rate (0.0104), and pe is the expected nominal
appreciation rate of owner-occupied homes.
The user cost depends on two income tax
parameters: tded and ty , the marginal income
tax rates on itemized deductions and investment
income, respectively. We assume that capital
gains on homes are untaxed. Since 1997, married
(single) homeowners have been able to realize
$500,000 ($250,000) of capital gains tax-free
after a holding period of two years. Relatively
few accruing housing capital gains are likely
to face taxation under this regime. In 2003,
the base year for our user cost calculations, the
ten-year Treasury yield was 4.01 percent, the
average mortgage interest rate was 5.82 percent,
and the Livingston Survey showed expected
CPI inflation of 1.4 percent. Real house price
inflation between 1980 and 2002, measured by
averaging state-level inflation rates calculated
from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
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Oversight (OFHEO) indices, was 0.73 percent
per year. We therefore assume an average nominal house price inflation rate of 2.13 15 0.73 1
1.402 percent.
The user cost evaluated at the marginal tax
rates corresponding to the “last dollar” of mortgage interest and property tax deductions, and
of investment income, determines the marginal
cost of consuming one more unit of owneroccupied housing. In equilibrium, each household’s imputed rental income 1R2 per unit of
housing capital divided by the asset price of a
unit of housing capital 1P2 equals the user cost:
R/P 5 c. Our analysis suggests that the ratio of
rental income to house value 1R/P2 varies across
age and income groups. Whether householdspecific variation in imputed rent values should
be considered when calculating the tax consequences of taxing imputed rent is an open question. Our illustrative calculations of the value of
imputed rent assume a single 1R/P2 ratio for all
owner-occupiers.
Table 2 presents our estimates of average “last
dollar” user costs in 2003, stratified by household age and income. The first panel shows estimates corresponding to the actual 2003 tax law.
The average user cost is 6.0 percent, but the values for various subsamples range from 4.7 to 7.2
percent. The progressive structure of the income
tax generates nontrivial variation in the user cost
across subcategories. For those with the highest
household incomes—more than $250,000—the
user cost averages 5.0 percent, while the user
cost averages 5.6 percent for households with
incomes of $75,000–$125,000 and 6.9 percent
for households with incomes below $40,000.
There is a 38 percent range between user costs
for the highest and lowest income groups.
The second panel of Table 2 considers the elimination of the tax-deductibility of mortgage interest payments. In this case, the user cost becomes
(2) 	

c9 5 11 2 ty 11 2 l2 2 rT
1 11 2 ty 2 b 1 m

1 11 2 tded 2 tprop – πe .

This equation assumes that the loan-to-value
ratio (l) does not adjust to the elimination of
mortgage interest deductibility, even though,
with this reform, those with both financial assets
and mortgages would be borrowing at the pretax
rate but investing at the after-tax rate of return.
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Martin Gervais and Manish Pandey (forthcoming) note that changing the tax treatment of
mortgage interest might have little impact on
the user cost if households altered their loanto-value ratios in response. We are not aware
of definitive estimates of how changing the tax
treatment of mortgage interest would affect loanto-value ratios, but this is clearly a key parameter
for evaluating the current tax expenditure.
The results in Table 2 suggest that repealing
the mortgage interest deduction, with no change
in loan-to-value ratios, would raise the average
user cost by 7 percent, from 6.0 to 6.4 percent.
The effect would be largest on the high-income,
young homeowners with high loan-to-value
ratios. These households may have limited holdings of other financial assets, so their capacity
to adjust their loan-to-value ratios may be muted
relative to other households.
The third panel of Table 2 considers elimination of the property tax deduction. The average
impact on the user cost is an increase of two-tenths
of one percentage point, from 6.0 to 6.2 percent.
There is less variation across subgroups for this
tax reform than for elimination of the mortgage
interest deduction, because property taxes as a
share of house value do not vary with age or
income as much as mortgage interest payments
as a share of house value. The effects of repealing either the mortgage interest or the property
tax deduction are greater at higher income levels
than at lower levels, because of these taxpayers’
higher marginal income tax rates. For those with
incomes of $250,000 and above, for example, the
average user cost rises from 5.1 percent to 5.4 percent when the property tax deduction is repealed.
The final panel of Table 2 examines how the
user cost would change if homeowners were
taxed as landlords. The specific tax reform we
consider includes gross rental income in adjusted
gross income but allows deductions for interest
payments, property taxes, maintenance, and economic depreciation. We assume that the current
tax treatment of capital gains on owner-occupied
housing would continue. In this case, the equilibrium condition for investment in an owner-occupied house would be
(3)

11 2 ty 2 1R/P2 5 11 2 ty 2

3 1rT 1 m 1 tprop 1 b)
2 tyl 1rM 2 rT2 2 pe.
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Table 2—Last-Dollar User Cost of Owner-Occupied Housing under Various Tax Policies

Income ($)

,40K

40–75K

Age of household head

75–125K

125–250K

250K1

All

0.049
0.050
0.052
0.056
0.051

0.047
0.050
0.050
0.053
0.050

0.058
0.057
0.058
0.068
0.060

0.058
0.058
0.056
0.055
0.057

0.065
0.063
0.062
0.069
0.064

0.049
0.052
0.052
0.055
0.053

0.060
0.059
0.060
0.069
0.062

2003 Law

25–35
35–50
50–65
. 65
All

0.064
0.065
0.067
0.072
0.069

0.060
0.060
0.060
0.065
0.061

25–35
35–50
50–65
. 65
All

0.067
0.068
0.068
0.072
0.070

0.066
0.065
0.063
0.066
0.065

0.053
0.054
0.056
0.063
0.056

Repeal of mortgage interest deduction
0.063
0.062
0.060
0.064
0.062

0.060
0.059
0.058
0.058
0.058

Repeal of property tax deduction
25–35
35–50
50–65
. 65
All

0.065
0.066
0.068
0.073
0.070

25–35
35–50
50–65
. 65
All

0.067
0.068
0.070
0.073
0.071

0.062
0.061
0.061
0.066
0.062

0.055
0.057
0.058
0.064
0.058

0.052
0.052
0.054
0.058
0.054

Apply landlord tax treatment to owner-occupied housing
0.065
0.065
0.067
0.069
0.066

0.061
0.062
0.064
0.068
0.063

0.057
0.059
0.061
0.066
0.060

0.055
0.060
0.060
0.063
0.061

0.064
0.064
0.065
0.071
0.066

Notes: Authors’ calculations using 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances and Moore’s (2003) interface between NBER
TAXSIM program and the SCF. Averages are weighted using the SCF’s replicate weights.

Solving for the equilibrium value of 1R/P2 , which
equals the user cost from (1), yields
(4)

1R/P2 5 rT 1 m 1 tprop 1 b

2 3ty /11 2 ty 2 4l 1rM 2 rT2

2 pe /11 2 ty 2.

User costs would rise substantially if owners
were taxed as if they were landlords. The average user cost in this case is 6.6 percent, and the
increase is especially large for higher-income
households. Households can choose the amount
of housing capital to hold, thereby altering their
marginal value 1R2 of another unit of housing services. Changes in user costs like those
reported in Table 2 translate into changes in
housing demand. They would affect real house
prices and the quantity of housing in a man-

ner that depends on housing market conditions
as described in Edward Glaeser and Gyourko
(2007).
III. The Distribution of Tax Benefits from
Housing Tax Expenditures

The last three panels in Table 1 provide
information on how changes in tax rules would
affect the tax liabilities of current homeowners. The table reports averages for homeowners in each age-income subcategory. The first
panel shows that while the average homeowner
saves $1,060 as a result of the mortgage interest
deduction, the benefits of this tax expenditure
are much greater for higher-income households.
This is a result both of larger mortgages and of
higher marginal tax rates. The highest mortgage
interest  deductions are found among young,
high-income households with expensive houses.

VOL. 98 NO. 2

Tax Expenditures for Owner-Occupied Housing

Among households under the age of 50 with
incomes between $125,000 and $250,000, for
example, the average tax saving from the mortgage interest deduction is roughly $3,600. For
25–35 year old homeowners with over $250,000
in income, the mortgage interest tax saving is
nearly twice this level: $7,077. Reflecting lower
loan-to-value ratios among the elderly, the average mortgage interest tax saving for homeowners over the age of 65 is only $149, and even
among those with incomes of $250,000 or more,
it is only $1,435.
The distribution of the subsidies in Table 1
differs from the pattern of changes in user cost
in Table 2 because it depends on the average
tax benefit from homeownership, while the user
cost calculation focuses on the marginal cost of
additional housing. Since housing deductions
frequently drive itemization, there can be large
gaps between average and marginal tax rates on
mortgage interest and property tax deductions.
The next panel shows that the average income
tax saving from the property tax deduction also
varies across age and income categories, but by
less than the saving from the mortgage interest
deduction. The average income tax saving from
this deduction peaks for middle-aged homeowners, rising from $393 for households under the
age of 35 to over $600 for those between 35 and
65. For those over 65, the average property tax
deduction falls to $242, reflecting both a decline
in the deductions among older relative to younger
households within each income subcategory, as
well as a shift toward lower income categories
and a corresponding decline in the probability
of itemizing deductions. For this group, the tax
savings from the property tax deduction substantially exceed those from the mortgage interest deduction.
The last panel in Table 1 presents the change
in income tax that would be associated with
imputing rental income to homeowners using
an economy-wide value for 1R/P2. We assume
that the average user cost in 2003, 6.0 percent,
would be used to impute the gross rental value
of owner-occupied homes, and that homeowners
could then deduct 2.5 percent of their home value
to reflect the cost of depreciation and maintenance. By applying the average user cost under
the current tax rules, we do not allow for the
adjustment of R/P or the level of housing capital
that would take place over time if the tax base
included imputed rent. Taxing net imputed rent
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would lead to substantially higher tax burdens
for homeowners. Average taxes would rise by
almost $1,900, and age 501 households making
$250,000 or more would owe $10,000 or more
in additional taxes. These figures are lower
for younger households and for poorer households—the lowest-income 25–35 age group
would owe just $655 more than today—reflecting lower income tax rates and house values.
Mortgage debt is concentrated among younger
homeowners, and many older homeowners do not
even have a mortgage. Consequently, many homeowners would face only a modest tax increase,
if any at all, if the mortgage interest deduction
were disallowed. In contrast, virtually all homeowners except those in the lowest income categories claim property tax deductions. Including
imputed rental income in the definition of taxable income would also affect all homeowners.
This suggests that the distribution of burdens
from eliminating the property tax deduction is
closer to that associated with taxing imputed
rent than to that for reducing the mortgage interest deduction, although the property tax deduction accounts for only one-quarter the revenue
loss of the exclusion of imputed rent.
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